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Radiation Exposure and
Cancer: A Simpler View of
Three Mile Island
The article by Wing et al. (1) introduced
the idea ofcalculating the relative intensity
of radioactive fallout between sectors of a
circle drawn around the accident at Three
Mile Island. The partition derived from
wind and weather data allowed a compari-
son ofratios ofradiation exposure between
sectors with cancer incidence ratios and
bypassed much ofthe uncertainty involved
in calculating actual doses. The results
indicated that higher fallout was correlated
with higher cancer incidence. Considering
that the average levels of radioactivity in
each sector were low, this could be inter-
preted as evidence for a proportional car-
cinogenic response to low doses ofionizing
radiation. There is, however, a simpler way
to interpret the same set ofdata.
Wing et al. (1) reported that some of
the people exposed to the fallout from the
accident showed signs of acute radiation
damage. They also reported that ground
measurements of radioactivity were not
adequate to show the details ofdistribution
ofthe fallout or the resulting doses to indi-
viduals. We are free to infer that the fallout
was patchy, that some ofthe residents were
exposed to high doses of ionizing radia-
tion, and that the data ofWing et al. (1)
show a correlation ofthe frequency ofhigh
exposure "hits" on people in each sector
with the sector's share of the region's
radioactive burden. In this view, increases
in cancer incidence were simply correlated
with the number of people hit by high
doses of ionizing radiation. This interpre-
tation is consistent with the conclusions
drawn by Raabe et al. (2) from data on
radium dial painters, the data set that
offers the most precise readings of both
individual radiation doses and carcinogenic
effects in humans. It is also consistent with
the patchy distribution of radioactive fall-
out from explosions often observed at the
Nevada Proving Grounds.
George G. Berg
University ofRochester School of
Medicine
Rochester, NewYork
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Consequences of the 1979
Three Mile Island Accident
Continued: Further Comment
As principal investigator ofthe Three Mile
Island (TMI) Accident Study funded by
the TMI Public Health Fund, I appreciate
the space for some observations further to
our reply (1) to Wing's reanalysis (2) of
our study (3,4). Two far from careful or
evenhanded news items (5,6), and your
own editorial (7) call for further comment.
My principal colleagues in this study
(Jan Beyea, Maureen Hatch, Sylvan
Wallenstein) and I are committed to rigor
in science as well as to the public health and
environmental movements. We applaud
your desire to air controversy. But we forsee
and fear the ultimate discredit that poor sci-
ence, together with advocacy parading as
science, can bring to epidemiology and the
movements of which we are a part. The
essential point is that what you label contro-
versy is not controversial in any real sense.
Instead, we have a situation manufac-
tured from misconceptions, misinterpreta-
tions, mistaken logic, and simple error.
Our results and those of Wing et al. (2)
differ in no important respect. Our conclu-
sions do differ: we saw no convincing evi-
dence that cancer incidence was a conse-
quence of the nuclear accident; they claim
there is such evidence. We urge you and
those ofyour readers interested in the issue
to study our original papers and reports
before judging. Your own (5) and other
news reports [for instance, The Lancet (4)]
ignored our published response to the
brouhaha. In that light, we need to expand
on some points and make some new ones.
At the heart ofthe matter, it seems to us,
isWing's assertion that ouroriginal interpre-
tation is based on circular reasoning. He
makes this charge, he says, because we did
not believe in the hypothesis under test. The
first oftwo objections to this charge is that it
is untrue. We had no such simplistic belief.
At the outset, in thelightofthe uncertainties
about the dose of radiation from the 1979
nudear accident, and also ofa reported clus-
ter of deaths that conceivably pointed to
acceleration of cancers already initiated, we
acceptedthepossibilityofan effect.
At the same time, given the short
postaccident observation period and the
putatively low dose, we were doubtful that
any but the most radiosensitive cancers
could be detected. We did not seek, but
were sought out, to investigate on behalfof
the TMI Public Health Fund. Our accep-
tance of the considerable undertaking
involved was realistic, with no great expec-
tation ofstartling results. Public duty at a
time when fear and unrest beset the affect-
ed communities was a strong motive.
This mistaken allegation about our
beliefs is much the lesser ofour two objec-
tions. The greater objection is to Wing's
claim that circular reasoning led to failure
to prove an apriorihypothesis we allegedly
did not believe. To test an apriorihypoth-
esis, which we did, is ofcourse a procedure
specifically designed to preclude circulari-
ty. More disturbing is the religious cast of
mind this charge displays. To make a prior
beliefa criterion forjudging evidence is the
very antithesis of any scientific or logical
method, from the inductivist Francis
Bacon early in the 17th century to the
hypothetico-deductive Karl Popper in the
20th. Whatever we do, we must surely aim
for a maximum of rigor and objectivity.
One is obliged to attempt disproof no less
than verification. In striving toward elusive
truth, apriori belief is beside the scientific
point. Passionate belief, which character-
ized Wing, maywell be a handicap.
An apriorihypothesis subject to test, by
contrast, is a considerable asset regardless of
belief. Wing's position amounts to a charge
that we are either incapable ofunderstand-
ing our data-on that score let our records
speak-or that we obfuscate or lie. In your
news report (5), indeed, Wing suggests the
latter: he is quoted as ascribing our conclu-
sions to author bias. (In this respect, should
there not have been mention of Wing's
role, with regard to the accident, as witness
for the plaintiffin personal injury litigation
against the TMI utilities?)
Wing's more specific case against our
report rests mainly on two particular issues,
namely, his use of relative rather than
absolute dose and the adjustments he made
for baseline conditions. Let us take these in
turn.
Wing makes much ofhis use ofrelative
dose as "an alternative logical approach"
and seems to reproach us on this score [see
Wing et al. (2), page 53, second and third
columns]. Although they later note that we
in fact used relative dose, in remarks to the
press (5) we are again reproved. So we
must make clear that all our major analyses
and results in fact derived precisely from
the use ofrelative dose.
Relative dose is not an exact or com-
plete description ofwhat we did. In a major
and labor-intensive effort, one of us U.
Beyea) carried out detailed topographic and
meteorologic mapping ofthe area to model
estimates of the direction and concentra-
tion of radiation emissions from the acci-
dent, from routine operations ofthe plant,
and from background radiation. To our
knowledge, ours was a unique approach to
deriving exposure measures in the face of
uncertain actual dose. We also divided the
local area at risk into 69 census-derived
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small tracts. We then compared cancer inci-
dence and mortality rates in the tracts most
heavily exposed with those less exposed,
having taken account of both background
radiation and routine plant emissions.
What Wing et al. (2) themselves did
about relative dose is not clear to us. In their
paper, no description was apparent, nor did
we recognize any consideration of back-
ground radiation or routine emissions, both
strong features of our overall analysis. We
assume that they made use ofour estimates
ofradiation distribution from the accident.
In our analysis, we judged observations
after the accident to be the critical test in
making adjustments for baselinevalues. We
were cautious in adjusting for demographic
and other such variables from the situation
existing before the accident because of
uncertainties in these data. No information
was to be had about subsequent migration,
and the target population could only be
that exposed to the accident and remaining
in the district thereafter.
In any case, in the matter ofcancers as
an outcome, our study sought effects ofthe
accident strictly in one direction. On this
ground, there would seem to be reason to
adjust for the baseline, but only after a pos-
itive effect was observed, and this we did.
An apparent effect could always be a conse-
quence merely ofthe previous distributions
of cancer existing in the affected areas.
Nonetheless, the datawere in the main pre-
sented stratified by area for postulated
exposure level and by time period. (We see
no point in the fuss Wing makes about
cancer incidence data from 1975-the first
of 5 preaccident years-that we concluded
were undercounted. In the absence of
detectable geographic bias our decision to
include them, and Wing et al's decision to
exclude them and adjust their results, are
equallyjustifiable.)
There is neither mystery nor obfuscation
in our presentation of the data. We are not
surewe can saythesame forWingetal. They
charge thatwewere constrained in ouranaly-
ses in respect of emissions estimated by the
judge's antecedent order. Certainly, we had
no direct access to the records of the TMI
Utility, butas farasweknow,whatwas avail-
able was published. Ofcourse, in using our
models Wing et al. (2) operate under exactly
the same constraint. We do not see that they
findanythingofnote not reportedbyus and,
indeed, they report rather fewer results than
wedoand in aless acessible manner.
Contrary to yet another allegation, our
recommendation was firm [to the TMI
Public Health Fund and also in print (4,8)]
that a follow-up was needed, both to allow
larger numbers of cases to accumulate in
the aftermath ofthe accident and to collect
individual level data on possible exposure
and confounding.
In sum, then, Wing et al. (2) make asser-
tions about what they take to be proven
effects while we are cautious in accepting
them as proven. It is a stretch to rate this dif-
ference, which your journal has given such
prominence, as a controversy. Can it be said,
in truth, that bygoing into contention Wing
et al. have advanced the cause ofthe commu-
nity or the environment? As we see it, they
have done no more than muddythewaters.
Mervyn Susser
Gertrude H. Sergievsky Center
Columbia University in the
City ofNewYork
NewYork, NewYork
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Response: Science, Public
Health, and Objectivity:
Research into the Accident at
Three Mile Island
Although controversies over scientific find-
ings are common, the topic of health
effects of ionizing radiation has generated
an exceptional amount of heat. Despite a
century of research since Roentgen's dis-
covery of X rays, fundamental disagree-
ments exist over biophysical mechanisms,
dose-response assumptions, analytical
strategies, interspecies extrapolations, and
the representativeness of studies of select
human populations (1-7). In the United
States, the last decade has seen revelations
about human radiation experimentation
(8) and a shift in responsibility for radia-
tion health effects research from the
Department of Energy to the Department
ofHealth and Human Services, stimulated
by concerns over secrecy and conflict of
interest (9,10). These disagreements have
been amplified by public and scientific
debates over military, energy, and medical
applications ofnuclear technology (11).
As one ofthe best known technological
failures of the nuclear era, the 1979 acci-
dent at the Three Mile Island nuclear
power plant has generated its share ofcon-
troversy, most recently in the pages of
Environmental Health Perspectives (12-16).
In his letter, Susser raises a number of
important issues related to the context and
logic ofresearch on health effects from the
1979 nuclear accident at Three Mile Island
(TMI) (17). We would like to follow his
lead by giving some background regarding
our involvement in the study of cancer
incidence in the 10-mile area around TMI
and also respond to some of his specific
points regarding the logic and methods of
the original study and our reanalysis.
Susser notes that he and his colleagues
did not seek the opportunity to study can-
cer incidence around TMI, but were asked
to investigate the accident "on behalfofthe
TMI Public Health Fund" (17). The Fund,
financed by the nuclear industry as a result
of a legal settlement, was governed by the
U.S. District Court for the Middle District
of Pennsylvania, which imposed require-
ments regarding the conduct of research
and the review and approval of reports by
attorneys for the industry (1i). We do not
suggest that this led Susser and colleagues
to alter findings or purposefully construct
research to support the industry. However,
to the extent that all research is influenced
by assumptions and beliefs from the fram-
ing of questions to the interpretation of
evidence, the context of negotiation with
industry representatives is important to
understanding the research product.
Like Susser, we did not seek out fund-
ing for our reanalysis and, like the original
research, our work was conducted in a con-
text that is important to understanding the
product. We were asked to review Susser
and Hatch's data on cancer incidence by
attorneys for approximately 2,000 plaintiffs
in a class action suit that was before the
same court that administered the TMI
Public Health Fund. Civil suits may be a
poor way to address public health prob-
lems; however, in our society, civil action
has played an important role by bringing
health issues (including asbestos, tobacco,
air and water pollution) to public atten-
tion, and has provided some recourse to
members of the public seeking protection
from powerful industries.
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